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1Against inertia
2ABSTRACT
In this paper I question the Inertial Theory of language change put forward by 
Longobardi (2001), which claims that syntactic change does not arise unless caused and 
that any such change must originate as an ‘interface phenomenon’. It is shown that these 
two claims and the contention that ‘syntax, by itself, is diachronically completely inert’  
(Longobardi 2001: 278), if construed as a substantive, falsifiable theory of diachrony, 
make predictions that are too strong, and that they cannot be reduced (as seems 
desirable) to properties of language acquisition. I also express doubt as to the utility and 
necessity of a methodological/heuristic principle of Inertia.
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31. INTRODUCTION
Longobardi (2001) put forward what he termed the INERTIAL THEORY of grammatical 
change, characterized by the statements in (1–3). 
(1) ‘syntactic change should not arise, unless it can be shown to be caused – that is, 
to be a well-motivated consequence of other types of change (phonological and 
semantic changes, including the disappearance of whole lexical items) or, 
recursively, of other syntactic changes’
(2) ‘linguistic change proper ... may only originate as an interface phenomenon’
(3) ‘syntax, by itself, is diachronically completely inert’
(Longobardi 2001: 277–278; emphases his)
This approach draws inspiration from work by Keenan (1994, 2002, 2009), 
which Longobardi refers to as ‘the pretheoretic concept of inertia’ (2001: 277; emphasis 
his). Keenan expresses this as in (4):
(4) ‘Things stay as they are unless acted upon by an outside force or DECAY’ (Keenan 
2002: 327; emphasis his)
 
The idea of inertia has received widespread attention in the literature on 
diachronic generative syntax, as can be seen by the number of papers making reference 
to it in recent conference volumes (e.g. Ferraresi & Goldbach 2008, Detges & Waltereit 
2008, Crisma & Longobardi 2009, Breitbarth, Lucas, Watts & Willis 2010). Reactions 
have ranged from broadly accepting (e.g. Lightfoot 2002: 130, Hróarsdóttir 2002, 2003, 
4Ferraresi & Goldbach 2003, Ingham 2006: 257, Roberts 2007: 232, Jäger 2008, Axel & 
Weiß 2010, Sundquist 2010) to more sceptical (Waltereit & Detges 2008, Biberauer & 
Roberts 2009: 74, Reintges 2009, Meisel 2011). However, no full critical discussion of 
the implications of the theory has yet appeared.
In this paper I question the value of the concept of inertia, demonstrating that the 
notion either is vacuous (trivially/definitionally true) or makes false empirical 
predictions. Furthermore, I suggest that even as a methodological heuristic the notion of 
inertia is not necessarily helpful. The version of inertia that I discuss most thoroughly in 
this paper is the theory spelled out by Longobardi (2001).1 Keenan’s (1994, 2002, 2009) 
conception of inertia is less susceptible to the criticisms made here, particularly those in 
section 3, since it is not evidently presented as a hypothesis about the nature of change 
with empirical consequences. 
In section 2 I discuss the intended status of inertia, showing, among other things, 
that it does not follow from Minimalist assumptions about the nature of the language 
faculty, and indeed is tangential to the Minimalist Program as ordinarily construed. 
Section 3 demonstrates that the Inertial Theory as outlined in (1–3), if construed as a 
substantive, falsifiable hypothesis about language change, CANNOT be true given the basic 
assumptions one must make about the functioning of language acquisition. Section 4 
discusses the role of an inertia-based approach as a heuristic, arguing that a 
methodological principle of this nature is desirable even if trivial; on the other hand, I 
express some scepticism about its utility and necessity, following Lass (1980, 1997) 
among others. Section 5 recapitulates and concludes.
1 It should be noted that I do not wish to question the account of the development of 
French chez that forms the bulk of Longobardi’s 2001 paper, which is elegant and 
supported by rich comparative and philological data.
52. THE INERTIAL THEORY: METHODOLOGICAL, SUBSTANTIVE, MINIMALIST?
It is clear that the Inertial Theory as set out in (1–3), or some combination thereof, 
cannot be taken as a principle of Universal Grammar or of the faculty of language in a 
broad sense. This is because the formulation of (1–3) crucially refers to change, which 
is a relation between different states of the faculty of language in different individuals, 
and to diachrony. Two options remain: either the Inertial Theory is to be viewed as a 
principle of change, perhaps reflecting some property of the language faculty, or it 
constitutes a methodological principle intended for use as a heuristic in investigating 
change.
Since Longobardi’s (2001: 275) stated aim is to ‘implement, for diachronic 
study, the spirit and some guidelines of Chomsky’s Minimalist Program’, it is worth 
considering the relation between the Inertial Theory and the Minimalist Program. A 
common distinction drawn within the Minimalist Program (e.g. by Epstein & Hornstein 
1999; Chomsky, Belletti & Rizzi 2002) is that between methodological and substantive 
Minimalism. Methodological Minimalism ‘is simply good scientific practice’ (Roberts 
2000: 853), and is essentially coextensive with the methodological principle of Occam’s 
Razor: entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity. There is nothing specifically 
linguistic about such an approach to inquiry. Central to linguistic Minimalism, however, 
is the question of ‘how well designed the system is’ (Chomsky, Belletti & Rizzi 2002): 
substantive Minimalism seeks to address the question of whether the faculty of 
language itself is optimally designed, as opposed to our theory of it.
One potential assumption is that the Inertial Theory follows from an aspect of 
substantive Minimalism, namely Chomsky’s (1995: 4–5) conjecture that there is no 
such thing as syntactic variation, with variation ‘limited to nonsubstantive parts of the 
6lexicon and general properties of lexical items’. Under this view, there is no variation 
across the human species in the syntactic component of the language faculty, and hence 
no such thing, strictly speaking, as ‘syntactic change’.2 Instead all change traditionally 
classed as syntactic is simply lexical change, specifically change in the formal features 
of (functional) lexical items; this is the approach to variation introduced by Borer 
(1984) and dubbed the ‘Borer-Chomsky Conjecture’ (BCC) by Baker (2008: 353). 
However, statements (1–2) do not support this view of the provenance of the Inertial 
Theory: if it were hypothesized that there were no such thing as ‘syntactic’ change, the 
suggestion that such change does not occur ‘unless caused’, and that it may originate as 
an interface phenomenon (preceded by semantic and/or morphophonological change), 
would be entirely redundant. Moreover, Longobardi (2001) suggests that the theory has 
‘empirically testable consequences’ and that it might turn out to be ‘empirically false or 
only partly correct’ (2001: 278). Since Longobardi assumes the BCC (2001: 278), the 
implication is that the LEXICON is inert, or at least the functional elements within it: if 
given cases of ‘lexical’ change have the potential to falsify the Inertial Theory then it  
cannot simply follow from the BCC that the syntactic component of the language 
faculty is invariant as discussed above.
Equally, however, if the consequences of the Inertial Theory are empirically 
testable, then it cannot be intended purely as a heuristic in the sense of methodological 
Minimalism. The answer to the question posed at the beginning of this section, then, 
appears to be that (1–3) are to be viewed as a principle of change. However, as 
Lightfoot (1979, 1999, 2002) has argued extensively, there can be no principles of 
2 An exception to this stricture, perhaps, is the question of how the core of the faculty of 
language itself evolved (cf. the ‘evolutionary adequacy’ of Longobardi 2003 and 
Gianollo, Guardiano & Longobardi 2008: 112); but this is a very different question to 
those usually asked in historical linguistics, and certainly not the one Longobardi (2001) 
addresses.
7history (2002: 134) and ‘there is no theory of change to be had independent of theories 
of grammar and acquisition’ (2002: 127). It is indeed difficult to see how an ontological 
claim could be made about diachrony in the same way such claims are made about the 
faculty of language, since there is no entity of which such a principle could be 
predicated. It is desirable, then, to reduce the Inertial Theory to properties of the faculty 
of language and to acquisition; however, I will demonstrate in section 3 that this is 
impossible given the claims made in (1–3) and the basic assumptions we must make 
about language acquisition.3
It is also worth raising the question here of why it should be SYNTAX that is inert. 
Longobardi (2001) takes a neutral position on whether semantics and phonology are 
inert in this way: he hypothesizes that ‘The semantic and phonological matrices of 
lexical items will, however, not be similarly constrained’ (2001: 278), adding that ‘It 
remains to be seen whether the more abstract principles of phonology and morphology 
are equally subject to the Inertial Theory’ (2001: 278, fn4). However, this seems 
unlikely, since if we were to hypothesize, following a version of (2), that ALL linguistic 
change were ‘a well-motivated consequence of other types of change’ (Longobardi 
2001: 278) we would predict that there would be no change at all, or at least no change 
with an ultimately endogenous origin (cf. also the Chicken-and-Egg Problem of Roberts 
2007: 125–6). On the other hand, there is no obvious conceptual or empirical reason to 
assume that syntax is inert but that phonology and morphology are not.
3. WHY AN ONTOLOGICAL INERTIAL THEORY DOES NOT WORK
3 Statement 1, if taken literally, makes little sense, as it implies that the DEMONSTRATION 
that a syntactic change has a cause, rather than the cause itself, is a necessary condition 
for that syntactic change to occur. I assume the following reading: ‘syntactic change 
does not arise unless caused.’
8Before an argument against the Inertial Theory can be sketched, some basic assumptions 
about language acquisition must be laid out. I will start this section by making explicit 
three such core assumptions in 3.1. The argument against the Inertial Theory itself 
follows in 3.2 in the form of a thought experiment.
3.1 Some basic assumptions
The first assumption I will make is (5).
(5) Assumption of DISCONTINUITY: Acquirers do not have direct access to the 
grammar of the target language.
(5) as an explicit assumption in work on language change dates back at least as 
far as Andersen (1973), who schematized language change as in Figure 1:
Figure 1
The Z-model of Andersen (1973: 767)
Subsequent work has recognized that matters are rarely quite this simple, and 
that the primary linguistic data (PLD) that reach the acquirer are usually the product of 
multiple distinct grammars rather than a single Grammar 1. Longobardi abstracts away 
from such cases, which he refers to (2001: 278, fn5) as ‘interference’ (cf. also the 
Grammar 1
Grammar 2
Output 1
Output 2
9discussion of ‘change’ vs. ‘diffusion’ in Hale 1998). The fact that the Inertial Theory can 
make no predictions in such cases is problematic, since virtually all language 
acquisition is actually done under conditions of grammar contact of a more or less 
substantial kind; the Inertial Theory is therefore a theory that holds for an idealized 
acquisition situation that in fact rarely occurs, and in this respect is similar to the 
problematic standard assumption made within work on first-language acquisition that 
the stable state of acquisition corresponds exactly to the target grammar, i.e. that 
learners converge perfectly on the grammar of their parents/peers (cf. Niyogi & 
Berwick 1995: 1, Roberts 2007: 229). Even if we were to grant that acquisition based on 
PLD generated by several virtually identical grammars is different in nature from 
acquisition based on PLD generated by wildly different grammars (e.g. Modern French 
and Wolof), and has more in common with acquisition within the idealized 
homogeneous speech community, ‘interference’ could still occur in these cases with 
respect to the points in which the similar grammars differ. An example might be the 
presence vs. absence of ‘British’ do, as in Fred will read the book, and Bill will (do) too: 
the presence of do here is only grammatical in British English (see e.g. Baltin 2007). 
Nevertheless, I will follow Longobardi in considering only the change scenario 
represented by the simplistic model in Figure 1, since this is the type of situation in 
which syntax is predicted to be inert by (1–3). The essential point is that there is no 
direct relation between Grammar 1 and Grammar 2; change is instead mediated by 
Output 1, the PLD, from which the acquirer must infer a grammar. This point is 
uncontroversial; no one would argue that language learners are telepathic, or that 
parameter settings are passed down from their parents as part of their genetic 
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endowment.4,5
The second assumption I wish to highlight is also straightforward if the 
Principles & Parameters approach to syntactic change is accepted:
(6) Assumption of EXPERIENCE: There exist parameters for which at least one value 
requires the presence of positive evidence in the PLD in order to be set.
Assuming (with Longobardi 2001: 278, Borer 1984, Chomsky 1995) that 
parameters can be reduced to the formal feature specifications of lexical items (see 
Baker 2008 for discussion), this is an obvious consequence: we might hypothesize that 
the child requires positive evidence in order to posit the presence of a feature as 
opposed to its absence.6 Longobardi in fact proposes a principle of ‘minimize feature 
content’ with exactly this effect (2001: 294), representing an aspect of the computational 
conservatism of the language learner (see Roberts & Roussou 2003 on this notion). 
More generally, however, (6) is required in order to make parametric acquisition 
function at all: if neither the presence nor the absence of a given feature requires 
positive evidence, then both must be entertained simultaneously (against normal 
assumptions; cf. J. D. Fodor 1998: 21, Roberts 2007: 22), since it is generally assumed 
4 Though Lightfoot (1979: 391) observes that certain typological theories of long-term 
drift in fact implicitly assume linguistic ‘racial memories’, and is rightly critical of such 
approaches.
5 I am assuming here that change is intimately linked with first language acquisition, as 
assumed by Paul (1920), Lightfoot (1979), Hale (1998), Roberts (2007: 123) and, 
implicitly, Longobardi (2001), among others. The assumption that ALL change stems 
from L1 acquisition events is far from uncontroversial; however, since this is not the 
focus of this paper, I abstract away from it here, as does Longobardi (2001).
6 As two reviewers observe, this formulation requires that features be privative, whereas 
much of the syntactic literature assumes a binary [±] or [attribute:value] feature 
structure. Of course, either of these systems can be reformulated in terms of privative 
features, though certain feature co-occurrence restrictions may then be required. These 
complications are purely formal, then, and do not affect the force of the argument here.
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that acquirers do not have access to negative evidence (see, for example, Gibson & 
Wexler 1994: 410 and the references cited there, and Johnson 2004).
For any given parameter, this conclusion can be questioned. One might argue 
that the posited parameter is not a standalone parameter at all but is rather set as part of 
a macroparametric cluster (cf. e.g. Baker 2001, 2008) on the basis of different evidence, 
or that it may be set on the basis of a process such as the ‘generalization of the input’ of 
Roberts (2007: 275). For instance, the headedness of TP could be hypothesized to be 
related to a Head Parameter governing the headedness of a much broader set of 
categories (as proposed by e.g. Chomsky & Lasnik 1993). In both cases, however, 
positive evidence is still required, in order to trigger the setting of the relevant 
macroparameter or the input generalization in the first place; (6) must simply hold at  
one remove from the feature we were initially considering. In the Head Parameter 
example, it might be argued, for instance, that the headedness of VP is instrumental in 
setting the headedness of TP.
Even if syntactic change is not framed in terms of parameters but in terms of 
patterns (Harris & Campbell 1995), rules (Newmeyer 2004, 2005), or constructions, it is 
still necessary to maintain a version of (6) stating that positive evidence is required in 
order for syntactic acquisition to take place. In essence, (6) is simply the claim that 
experience (the second of Chomsky’s (2005) three factors) plays a role in the 
acquisition of syntax.
The third assumption I wish to highlight is more controversial:
(7) Assumption of DETERMINISM: The acquisition of syntax is a deterministic process.
12
Since the term ‘deterministic’ is used in many senses within linguistics, it is 
useful to clarify this further. The intended meaning of (7) is that, for any temporally 
ordered set of sentences (PLD), any and all learners exposed to it will converge on the 
same grammar: there is no ‘“imperfect” learning or “spontaneous” innovation’ 
(Longobardi 2001: 278).7 Clearly (7) is necessary for any version of the Inertial Theory, 
since imperfect learning and spontaneous innovation cannot be said to be ‘caused’ by 
interface phenomena: the falsity of (7) entails the falsity of (2). It is therefore also 
necessary to assume (7) if one wishes to demonstrate that it is logically impossible for 
the Inertial Theory laid out in (1–3) to be true.
The principle of determinism in (7) is a non-trivial hypothesis about the 
acquisition of language, and makes empirical predictions that are in principle testable.  
In fact, the equivalent of (7) for phonology may well be false, since cases of apparently 
spontaneous innovation with no obvious basis in the PLD have been reported in the 
literature: one well-known case is the so-called ‘click girl’, a 4-year-old who substituted 
a dental click for all alveolar and postalveolar affricates and fricatives (Bedore, Leonard 
& Gandour 1994). Following Hale (1998: 5), we might assume that all such innovations 
during acquisition should be considered as changes, regardless of whether or not they 
diffuse. Such innovations could potentially be ascribed to details of the trigger 
experience, or of perception or the motor organs, of which we are not aware, but the 
argument for determinism becomes less and less intuitively plausible the further one 
takes such rescue operations. (7) is also not universally assumed by researchers in 
syntactic learnability: J. D. Fodor (1998) adopts it, but this is as a reaction to the 
nondeterministic Trigger Learning Algorithm of Gibson & Wexler (1994), which selects 
7 The precise definition of PLD varies in the literature, as noted by Hale (1998: 1, fn1). I 
here take it to be the input to the linguistic learning system in the child’s mind rather 
than a raw acoustic stream.
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a parameter randomly if an unanalyzable sentence is encountered (1994: 410), as do the 
variants presented by Niyogi & Berwick (1995). The more recent variational model of 
Yang (2002, 2004: 453) returns to the nondeterministic position by selecting a grammar 
randomly (with varying probabilities) in order to analyse each input sentence.8 
Furthermore, if one believes that the language faculty itself matures with age 
independently of the input received (as do e.g. Borer & Wexler 1992), then we must 
also stipulate that (7) will only be true if the learners are exposed to sentences in the 
PLD at the same stage of development. Nevertheless, since I know of no evidence from 
syntactic acquisition definitively falsifying the assumption of determinism, I take it that  
(7) is an interesting and valuable hypothesis for researchers in syntactic acquisition and 
change, since its predictions are strong, and, if true, it would provide an excellent 
foundation for (comparatively) explanatory accounts of change. Chomsky (1986: 235) 
in fact implicitly endorses a version of (7) when he states that ‘On the Cartesian 
assumptions, I attribute to you ... rules that I would have followed had I had your 
experience.’
It must be noted that (7) is not coextensive with the Inertial Theory, although it 
is an integral part of it. The Inertial Theory ‘excludes the intervention of probabilistic 
models in the development of syntax’ (Longobardi 2001: 278), as does (7) insofar as 
such models include a ‘roll of the dice’ as part of the acquisition algorithm itself, as in 
the models developed by Clark & Roberts (1993), Gibson & Wexler (1994) and Yang 
(2002, 2004). However, unlike (1– 3), (7) by itself makes no claim about the relation 
between grammars diachronically: it does not claim that acquirers will converge 
8 Yang (2002: ch. 5) in fact takes a similar position to (7) in his discussion of diachrony: 
‘the only source for the discrepancy between two generations of speakers must lie in the 
linguistic evidence’ (2002: 127). However, this does not follow as a consequence of his 
model, which is probabilistic, as discussed. 
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perfectly on the target grammar, and in this respect is more similar to the ‘weak 
determinism’ of Roberts & Roussou (2003: 13) and Roberts (2007: 231). Given that the 
Inertial Theory in (1–3) is false if the assumptions of discontinuity and experience in 
(5–6) are true, as demonstrated in section 3.2, I tentatively suggest that the principle of 
determinism in (7) is methodologically the ‘next best thing’ to the Inertial Theory in 
terms of empirical predictions about diachrony.
3.2 The thought experiment
Imagine a child whose parents’ grammar, Grammar 1, requires V-to-C movement in wh-
questions. I take it here that the postulation of the presence of this movement requires 
evidence in the data, following the assumption of experience, (6); this may not in fact be 
the case for this feature, of course. The crucial point is that at least one aspect of the 
parents’ grammar is not acquirable without positive evidence, and here, for the purpose 
of exemplification, I take one such aspect to be V-to-C movement in wh-questions.
Like Longobardi (2001), I abstract away from ‘interference’ and assume that the 
PLD the child is exposed to is generated by a single grammar, or at least uniform with 
respect to this particular feature. Slightly implausibly, but for the sake of concreteness, 
let us suppose that the child is only exposed to sentences spoken by her parents, both of 
whom have identical grammars in all relevant respects.
Now let us suppose that the parents never needed or wanted to ask direct 
questions in the presence of the child, and therefore that Output 1—the PLD—includes 
no relevant examples. The child therefore fails to acquire V-to-C movement in wh-
questions in her grammar, Grammar 2.9
9 Of course, another logical possibility is that the property requiring positive evidence is 
V-in-situ rather than V-to-C movement. In this case, the argument could be constructed 
precisely the opposite way round, with Grammar 1 lacking V-to-C movement and 
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Syntactic change has clearly occurred in the above scenario. Note that there is no 
change in Grammar 1 itself, only in its output, which cannot be attributed to 
intralinguistic factors. Yet Grammar 2 is different. Is this change ‘caused’, in the 
terminology of (1)? On the standard scientific assumption that the world is causally 
structured (cf. Popper 1968: 67 and section 4.1 below), it is desirable to assume that it 
is. Yet this cause cannot be said to be a well-motivated consequence of other types of 
change; instead the cause is clearly an extralinguistic one, namely whatever motivated 
the fluctuation in the trigger experience. Here it is essentially chance that has ‘caused’ 
the change; even assuming (7), there is simply no guarantee that the PLD will contain 
relevant examples.
The non-expression of a particular type of datum in the PLD is, of course, itself 
causal in a sense: it is what Lightfoot (2006: 165) terms the ‘local cause’ of a change. 
However, as (1) makes clear, this is not what Longobardi (2001) conceives of as a 
‘cause’. Furthermore, the acceptance of non-expression in the PLD as ultimate cause of 
a change is not conducive to a satisfactorily explanatory model of syntactic change, 
since the details of the precise PLD available to acquirers at a specific point in time are 
not within our reach (as Lightfoot (2006: 159) observes), and so any such ‘explanation’ 
will be post hoc and stipulative. The natural next question to ask is what motivated this 
non-expression, and in order to answer this question extralinguistic notions must be 
taken into consideration.
To take the scenario in a slightly different direction, it could have been the case 
that the parents were members of a religious group whose teachings state that it is 
deeply sinful to ask direct questions. Being good cult members, the parents adhered to 
Grammar 2 innovating it. Moreover, a reviewer notes the intriguing possibility that in 
this scenario the child would fail to acquire wh-questions entirely; this would, of course, 
involve a change in any case.
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this restriction in an exemplary fashion, and so in this case too there would be no 
relevant examples in the PLD. If we are to maintain (1), the notion of causality must be 
understood to be so broad as to be entirely vacuous, making no empirical predictions at 
all, since a wide variety of extralinguistic events, and even chance non-occurrence, 
would need to be analysable as a ‘cause’. At the very least, human intentionality—the 
‘planning’ of utterances—must be taken into account, and it has been argued that this is 
inherently non-deterministic (Popper & Eccles 1977; Lass 1980: 31) and therefore not 
amenable to explanation in terms of causality.10 Lightfoot (2006: 165) makes a similar 
point: ‘What we cannot explain, in general, is why the linguistic environment should 
have changed in the first place’, since a vast number of contingent factors are involved. 
All in all, then, it seems that (1), the claim that syntactic change does not arise unless 
caused, either is axiomatic and trivially true, hence making no empirical predictions, or 
makes predictions that are too strong.
The scenario above is even more of a problem for (2), since there can be no 
question that the change in this scenario might have originated as an ‘interface 
phenomenon’: no semantic or morphophonological change preceded it. The change is 
purely syntactic, involving only the formal features of items in the lexicon. The only 
way to deny this would be to claim that the syntactic parameter in question (V-to-C 
movement in wh-questions, or any other example one cares to imagine, hence all 
syntactic parameters) were set entirely on the basis of semantic and/or 
10 Which is not to say that all aspects of human cognition are so; for instance, it seems 
plausible that the acquisition process, and the process of syntactic derivation, might be 
‘mechanical’ in the requisite sense, with no intentionality directly involved, and indeed 
this hypothesis is fundamental to cognitive science as a discipline. But extending this 
type of determinism to intentionality means that ‘we must end up as behaviourists, and 
reduce man to a bête-machine’ (Lass 1980: 102). Such a stance would not be compatible 
with the mentalist view adopted by e.g. J. A. Fodor (1983) and Chomsky (1975: ch4, 
1995: 2), among others, that the study of the ‘central system’ of the mind, as opposed to 
its submodules, is an intractable problem.
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morphophonological features, and that the absence of these features in the PLD was 
responsible for their non-acquisition in the child’s grammar and thus indirectly for the 
syntactic change. But as well as reducing the whole Inertial Theory to vacuous triviality, 
this equates to denying (6), since by claiming that all syntactic (formal) features are set 
on the basis of semantic and/or morphophonological features one is denying the 
existence of syntactic acquisition as a primitive process. As discussed in 3.1, such a 
position is untenable, and not the one adopted in Longobardi (2001). Finally, if (2) is 
false of this scenario, then (3) is also false: syntax is not ‘diachronically completely 
inert’, since we have here a syntactic change which occurred apparently without a 
semantic or morphophonological cause.
Some further comment is needed on the nature of the scenario mentioned above. 
It involves SYSTEMATIC rather than random endogenous variation, in that the PLD is not 
purely a random subset of tokens of grammatical sentences as assumed in work on 
learnability (e.g. by Niyogi & Berwick 1995: 10). The assumption of randomness may 
be a necessary step in a formal model of acquisition in order to avoid incorporating a 
Theory of Everything into the model, but there is no reason to believe that it reflects any 
underlying reality. Parents are perfectly capable of choosing to lock their child in the 
cellar and to address it using sentences composed solely of the word fish, and such 
engineered systematic endogenous variation would be bound to have implications for 
the grammar acquired by the child. Assuming random endogenous variation, however, 
one cannot guarantee that all sentences will NOT be composed solely of the word fish. 
Hence the (realistic) assumption of the possibility of systematic endogenous variation is 
not even necessary for the scenario above to go through.
One may object that the scenario sketched in this section is incredibly unlikely 
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to occur. This should not affect the force of the argument, however, since the logical 
possibility of such a change cannot be denied. As Niyogi & Berwick (1995: 2) put it, 
‘even if the PLD comes from a single target grammar, the actual data presented to the 
learner is truncated, or finite. After a finite sample sequence, children may, with non-
zero probability, hypothesize a grammar different from that of their parents.’ In other 
words, models of language learning that meet Gold’s (1967) learnability criterion of 
‘identification in the limit’ cannot be taken to lead to successful convergence in real-
world cases of language acquisition, as Gold himself recognizes (1967: 450; see also 
Johnson 2004). Even if it is the case that the overwhelming majority of syntactic 
changes originate as interface phenomena (and can be said to be ‘caused’ in an 
explanatorily useful sense), the scenario outlines a counterexample to (2–3), which as a 
consequence can no longer be upheld as universal claims about diachrony, at least not if 
they have any predictive power. We are therefore forced to conclude that the Inertial 
Theory, in its substantive form, is false.
4. INERTIA AS A METHODOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE
As well as claiming that the Inertial Theory has ‘empirically testable consequences’, 
Longobardi (2001: 278) refers to it as a ‘research program’, adding that ‘even if the 
Inertial Theory turns out to be empirically false or only partly correct, an important 
quality ... is its heuristic value: it forces us to look for explanations for all syntactic 
changes’. This section is devoted to exploring the consequences of this methodological 
principle. Explanations for syntactic (and other) changes are, obviously, desirable: such 
a position is so common as to be trivial among historical linguists. However, this section 
argues that it is not necessarily the case that all our energies should be devoted to 
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seeking such explanations, and that it is certainly not the case that an approach that fails 
to do so is unscientific or uninteresting. Relevant considerations to this end are drawn 
from three different disciplines: historical phonology in 4.1, the study of syntactic 
learnability in 4.2, and (more tentatively) evolutionary biology in 4.3.
It should be noted here that it is easy to see why such a methodological principle 
might be proposed. As Longobardi notes (2001: 275, emphasis his), ‘much recent work 
in diachronic syntax has actually been guided by the aim of describing changes (e.g., 
parameter resetting), rather than by concerns of genuine explanation.’ Here I concur: 
although formalizing a syntactic change in terms of parametric change is a valuable 
exercise in itself, it is not diachronically explanatory alone. However, a general theory 
of how internally caused change (as illustrated in section 3.2) can arise is at least as 
valuable as a set of external explanations of particular changes, and for this reason if no 
other we should be wary of a methodological Inertia principle. Furthermore, once the 
possibility of internally caused change in general is accepted, then methodological 
Minimalism gives us no reason to suspect that any particular syntactic change should be 
‘caused’ by preceding semantic or morphophonological changes in the sense of the 
Inertial Theory.
4.1 Explanations in historical phonology
The stance taken by Longobardi (2001) contrasts markedly with that taken in historical 
phonology, a field in which, arguably, few if any true explanations of individual changes 
have ever been proposed. Although the Neogrammarians, to whose work Longobardi 
compares his own (2001: 278), identified broad areas which could be responsible for 
language change in general, such as child language acquisition (Paul 1920 [1880]) and 
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ease of articulation, they came up with no specific causal explanations that are accepted 
today; cf. McMahon (1994: 18) for discussion.
Much subsequent work has made a great deal of progress in identifying the sort 
of circumstances in which (certain types of) changes typically occur. To take just a few 
examples, the work of Ohala (e.g. 1981) has shown that abrupt phonological changes 
can typically occur when the speech signal is reanalysed by the listener, e.g. the 
nasalization of vowels before nasal consonants and subsequent loss of the consonant 
itself. Blevins (2004: 32) sets out three possible routes by which sound change can take 
place: misperception, misapplication of mapping from phonetic to phonological form in 
ambiguous inputs, and choice of a different variant as prototype from that of Grammar 1 
(cf. Bowern 2008: 198 for an interesting attempt to extend this model to syntax). Labov 
(2007) has proposed a distinction between change located in first language acquisition 
(transmission) and change located in ‘extragenerational learning’ (diffusion), with the 
latter typically being ‘slower, less regular, and less governed by structural constraints’ 
(2007: 383), exemplified by the incomplete outward spread of the complicated short-a 
tensing system of New York City (2007: 353–372).
Yet there is a sense in which all the above works can be taken as proposing 
typologies of change situations rather than actually explaining changes. This is the 
position taken by Lass (1980), who, after examining and dismantling a wide range of 
candidates for explanations in the causal, deductive-nomological sense, argues that it 
may not be appropriate to seek such explanations in linguistics. The central conclusion 
of Lass (1980) can be summed up by the claim that ‘there are no D[eductive]-
N[omological] explanations in historical linguistics, because “laws” of the appropriate 
kind do not exist’ (1980: 90). Lass also argues (1980: 101–3) that Popper’s 
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methodological version of the principle of causality, ‘the simple rule that we are not to 
abandon the search for universal laws and for a coherent theoretical system, nor ever 
give up our attempts to explain causally any kind of event we can describe’ (Popper 
1968: 67), while attractive, may not be appropriate ‘for any discipline whose main 
interest is in the behaviour of sentient beings’ (1980: 102). Lass (1997), while 
acknowledging some weaknesses of his earlier work, remains convinced that it is not 
the case that ‘causal explanations are or ever will be available’ in historical linguistics 
(1997: 336). At the core of his contention is the argument that human intentionality 
must be involved in language transmission/diffusion (a view also endorsed in section 
3.2 of this paper), that such intentionality should not be described in terms of nomic 
causality, and that such causality is therefore not an appropriate concept in studying 
language change. Discussion of this important thesis is notably absent from 
Longobardi’s 2001 paper. Since the heuristic version of the Inertial Theory mentioned at 
the beginning of this section bears strong similarities to Popper’s methodological 
version of the principle of causality as outlined above, which Lass claims is 
inappropriate to diachronic linguistics, this is a worrying omission.
In conjunction with the criticisms presented in section 3 of this paper, there is 
indeed reason to doubt that the Inertial Theory should be accepted even as a heuristic. 
While it may be the case that, given a set of PLD and an appropriate learning algorithm, 
we can predict the mature state of an individual’s linguistic competence (cf. (7) above) 
or perhaps the probabilities of different linguistic states being reached, we have seen 
that it is impossible for us to predict this state based solely on the grammar(s) 
generating the PLD, since the PLD itself is just too unpredictable. Given this result, 
there is no reason to expect that, following a heuristic version of the Inertial Theory, one 
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would find the sort of linguistic ‘cause’ discussed in Longobardi (2001), even for post  
hoc explanations of changes that have occurred. Here, therefore, one is broadly led to 
concur with Lass (1980: 99–101) that such a heuristic, while attractive, is inappropriate 
in historical linguistics, or at least that it should not be the only direction taken.
4.2 Explanations in syntactic learnability theory
Inertia as a heuristic is also strangely at odds with the results of syntactic learnability 
theory, as hinted at in section 3.1. Briefly put, many learnability algorithms proposed in 
the literature make no claims about relations between Grammar 1 and Grammar 2 in the 
way that the ontological version of the Inertial Theory does, and nor do they even 
assume (7)—that language acquisition is a deterministic process. The Trigger Learning 
Algorithm of Gibson & Wexler (1994), upon which the diachronic model of Niyogi & 
Berwick (1995) is based, relies on the existence of local maxima to explain change: the 
learning algorithm contains a ‘roll of the dice’ which may lead learners irretrievably 
astray in a certain proportion of cases. Similarly, the probabilistic component of the 
model developed by Yang (2002) may lead to the acquirer assigning different weights to 
certain hypotheses than the individuals from whose competence the PLD is generated. 
In the account of language learning as a genetic algorithm in Clark & Roberts (1993), 
‘since nothing in the approach requires ... [the fittest] grammar to be consistent with the 
one that underlies the input text, learners may arrive at final-state systems that differ 
from those of their parents’ (1993: 303). Their algorithm contains a ‘mutation operator’ 
which alters the value of a randomly selected parameter (1993: 310–311).
Since it is agreed among researchers in diachronic generative syntax (following 
Lightfoot 1979) that properties of change should ideally fall out from a theory of 
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grammar and a learning algorithm, there is a strong case to be made that the 
assumptions underlying these models should not be rejected out of hand. And, just as 
we found in the last section, these assumptions conflict with those of the Inertial 
Theory: in none of these models is it possible to discover a necessary and sufficient 
condition for EVERY change that might occur.11 Even in a model such as that of J. D. 
Fodor (1998), which does accept a deterministic process of acquisition, there can be no 
guarantee that the actual PLD will provide the necessary syntactic evidence for 
convergence in parameter setting. It follows that looking for such causes should not be 
the be-all and end-all of diachronic syntax as methodological Inertia would have it.
4.3 Explanations in evolutionary biology
This last subsection is devoted to exploring the parallels between a domain of 
diachronic biology and historical linguistics (not a new endeavour; cf. Paul 1920 
[1880], Lightfoot 1979, Lass 1980: 103–109, Clark & Roberts 1993 and Yang 2002, to 
name but a few).
As pointed out by Clark & Roberts (1993: 300–301), the sequence of parameter 
settings representing a ‘grammar’ (and thus, broadly speaking, an individual’s 
competence in a language, abstracting away from competing grammars in the sense of 
Kroch 1989 and Yang 2002) can be taken to be analogous to an individual’s DNA. 
Importantly, like grammars, DNA is not transmitted directly from individual to 
individual or from cell to cell: in the case of replication, its transmission is mediated by 
11 As an aside, a reviewer notes that acceptance of the BCC and of a microparametric 
approach to syntactic change raises a potentially serious problem with regard to 
learnability, since learning algorithms of the kind discussed in this section have their 
formal basis in traditional parametric theory, and it is not immediately obvious how they 
can be expressed in microparametric terms. This is clearly an area in which substantial 
research is needed.  
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DNA polymerase enzymes, a process that can be taken to be analogous to language 
acquisition in this context. As in the case of language acquisition, the fidelity of this 
process is very high: the new strand matches its template in the vast majority of cases, 
in the same way that the acquirer’s grammar matches that which generated the PLD. 
However, mistakes do occur, roughly once for each 109 nucleotides copied (Alberts et  
al. 2002: ch. 5): mutations arising from copying error in this way are generally 
described as spontaneous. Spontaneous mutations could be regarded, in turn, as 
analogous to the type of linguistic change whose possibility was outlined in section 3.2, 
in which variation in the data actually produced from Grammar 1, for extralinguistic 
reasons, makes it impossible for the acquirer to match it in Grammar 2. It is important 
to note that neither in the case of ‘spontaneous’ linguistic change nor in the case of 
‘spontaneous’ mutation are we forced to conclude that the event has NO cause at all that 
can be incorporated into a deterministic model (though one might conclude this; cf. 
Mayr 1968 and the discussion in Lass (1980: 106–107)). Rather, we might make a 
methodological decision to ignore the causes of such events because they take place on 
a level in which we are not interested or to which we have insufficient access: in the 
biological case, molecular decay;12 in the linguistic case, the precise distribution of the 
PLD accessible to a single acquirer. These levels might be amenable to investigation if 
we were to conduct the right (synchronic) study; however, for specific historical 
developments we have no access to this information either in linguistics or in biology.
12 This recalls Keenan’s original formulation of Inertia given in (4) above, which makes 
reference to decay. Indeed, a notion of decay seems to be what is missing from 
Longobardi’s (2001) formulation. Accepting (7), that language acquisition is (weakly) 
deterministic, one may wish to view decay as driven by the (‘accidental’) non-
occurrence of relevant data in the PLD, which leaves us with a form of ‘weak inertia’ 
diachronically, as suggested to me by Ian Roberts (p.c.). This ‘weak inertia’, if one 
wants to call it that, is coextensive with the assumption of determinism in (7) and 
compatible with Keenan’s (2002) view of Inertia, but not with the theory presented in 
Longobardi (2001).
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This has been the approach taken in evolutionary biology since Darwin: as 
Lewontin (1983: 65–66) stresses, the emphasis in this variational paradigm has been on 
explaining why certain types persist and others do not, with the question of how variants 
themselves arise accorded only secondary importance if considered at all. I would 
suggest that the task of the historical syntactician should be the same as that of the 
Darwinian evolutionary biologist: to explain, through reference to endogenous factors 
(such as the Transparency Principle of Lightfoot 1979, or the Subset Principle of 
Berwick 1985, Atkinson 2001, Biberauer & Roberts 2009, to name just a few potential 
examples) or exogenous factors (language contact etc.) as appropriate, the persistence 
and spread of types once those types have come into being. This conclusion runs 
counter to what has been suggested by Hale (1998), among others, and yet I believe it to 
be the only sensible one, given that the specifics of the PLD of acquirers of previous 
millennia are forever beyond our grasp. Hale’s assertion that ‘diffusion ... represents the 
trivial case of acquisition: accurate transmission’ (1998: 5) is highly problematic. In the 
vast majority of cases of diffusion, the acquirer will be faced with data from several 
distinct grammars, not just one, and must choose between them (again abstracting away 
from competing grammars in the sense of Kroch 1989 or Yang 2002). Exactly how this 
choice is made is a nontrivial question, and I see no reason that endogenous as well as 
exogenous factors should not be involved. Willis (1998: 47–48) in fact proposes such a 
model, in terms of ‘multiple reactuation’, where the same actuation triggered by the 
same factors occurs in multiple speakers, rather than diffusion alone. Importantly, I do 
not mean to suggest that we should abandon the close link between acquisition and 
language change emphasized by Lightfoot (1979, 1999, 2006). In fact, if anything, such 
a ‘multiple reactuation’-based approach brings more actual instances of language 
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change into the purview of an acquisitionist approach to change, since recourse to 
endogenous factors may be taken to explain cases that Hale (1998) and other narrow 
actuationists would class as ‘diffusion’ and as belonging to a different explanatory 
domain.
It is not the case that one approach is a priori more valuable or scientific than 
the other. The actuation-centred approach advocated by Longobardi (2001) and Hale 
(1998, 2007) is perhaps more in the spirit of (an idealized version of) physics, while the 
approach I am advocating bears more affinities with evolutionary biology (cf. also 
Lightfoot 2006: 165). To an extent, the two approaches are complementary; however, I 
concur with Lass (1980) in arguing that the latter approach may be more 
methodologically appropriate for historical linguistics, given its subject matter, and 
certainly for the explanation of specific changes. Rather than seeking narrowly causal 
explanations of a kind which may be impossible to achieve, we should instead be 
identifying the factors (both endogenous and exogenous) which might have aided a 
variant grammar in persisting or becoming more prevalent.
5. CONCLUSION
I began this paper by introducing inertia and the Inertial Theory and clarifying some of 
the basic notions behind it, including its relation to the Minimalist Program (sections 1–
2). I then demonstrated that, under reasonable assumptions about syntactic acquisition, 
the ontological Inertial Theory makes predictions that are too strong (section 3). In the 
process I suggested an alternative that may be worthy of further consideration: the 
slightly weaker notion that the acquisition of syntax is a deterministic process. Finally, 
and more speculatively, I offered some suggestions as to why the methodological 
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heuristic correlate of the Inertial Theory may not be the ideal guiding force in our field, 
drawing on neighbouring disciplines for illustration (section 4), and outlined my view of 
an ideal diachronic syntax.
It may be objected at this stage that we have come a long way from the original 
intuition behind Inertia: the simple and appealing notion, most elegantly captured by 
Keenan (1994, 2002, 2009), that linguistic change is not wildly unconstrained. 
However, such an objection is orthogonal to the main concern of this paper. 
Longobardi’s (2001) specific formulation of an Inertial Theory, he claims, is a 
‘nontrivial hypothesis’ and has ‘empirically testable consequences’ (2001: 278); this is 
very different from the inoffensive intuition just discussed. The main aim of this paper 
has been to show that, if the Inertial Theory is really a nontrivial hypothesis, it is a false 
one; a subsidiary aim of this paper has been to show that as a ‘research program’ and as 
a ‘heuristic’ (2001: 278) it may not be the only, or indeed the best, way to make 
progress in the field of diachronic syntax. The original intuition behind inertia thus 
stands unsullied.
We should, then, seek alternatives to the Inertial Theory. In its place, I would 
suggest, we have two research directions. One is the conjecture that the acquisition of 
syntax, or perhaps language acquisition more generally, is a deterministic process. The 
other is the notion that the diffusion of linguistic variants across populations should be 
given a much more central position in current theorizing in diachronic syntax, in an 
approach that takes first language acquisition and endogenous factors to play a key role 
in diffusion/reactuation as well as in traditional actuation, broadly following the 
research tradition initiated by Lightfoot (1979). Both, I hope, represent interesting 
avenues for exploration.
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